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Abstract 
With the decision early 2002 to develop 
Galileo, the second generation European 
GNSS-system, and to have it fully 
operational by 2008, the member states of 
the European Union (EU) and the 
European Space Agency (ESA) have taken 
a large step forward. The question "Quo 
vadis, Galileo?' has therefore, by and 
large, been answered - 'Into orbit!' 
However, many legal parameters for the 
future system have yet to be defined; 
amongst those one of the most important is 
the definition and establishment of the 
institutional structure which should bring 
Galileo there and make sure it remains 
there, in a safe, sensible and operational 
manner. In other words: 'Quis vadit cum 
vobis, Galileo?' - 'Who goes (there) with 
you?' 
The paper will present a brief overview of 
the issues involved in determining and 
developing the future institutional 
structure of Galileo, starting with the 
current Galileo Interim Support Structure 
(GISS) and the Joint Undertaking (JU) 
which will be its successor. This will lead 
into the issue of the prospective public 
supervisor and private operator which are 
supposed to be at the core of that 
institutional structure, tied together by a 
Concession Agreement-type of 
arrangement. 
In reflecting upon the various issues, 
attention will be paid to an interesting 
precedent from the satellite sector, i.e. the 
privatisation of INMARSAT and its 
transformation into Inmarsat. Other issues 
to be touched upon in this light concern 
the possibilities for non-EU and non-ESA 
member states to join the Galileo core 
institutional structure, the need for co-
ordination and interoperability with GPS 
and GLONASS (and possible other 
systems), issues of negotiation with non-
European states, and dealing with liability 
issues. 
1. Introduction 
Early 2002, the member states of the 
European Union (EU) and the European . 
Space Agency (ESA) gave the final green 
light for the development of Galileo. 1 
According to the planned time schedule, 
by 2008 some 30 satellites in MEO will 
provide various timing, positioning and 
navigation signals, in a number of cases 
being vastly superior (in particular in 
terms of accuracy and integrity2) to signals 
emitted by the current GPS3 and 
GLONASS4 systems. 
At ITU's WRC 2000 and the recent 2003 
WRC the necessary frequencies for 
Galileo were secured. Then, last July also 
the contracts for the first two Galileo 
satellites were signed - one with Surrey 
Satellite Technologies, the other with 
Galileo Industries. In other words: all is 
set now for Galileo to prepare for Full 
Operational Capacity, due by 2008. 
In further preparing the stage however, 
one of the major issues concerns the 
details of the institutional structure which 
is to run Galileo. Contrary to GPS and 
GLONASS, run by the military authorities 
of a single country with other 
governmental departments being merely 
involved through consultation boards and 
their likes, Galileo was envisaged from the 
beginning as a Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP). The private sector should be 
Copyright©2003 by Frans G. von der Dunk. Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, Inc., with permission. 
360 
von der Dunk in Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 360-370 (2003). 
Copyright 2003, Frans G. von der Dunk. Used by permission.
fundamentally involved in financing, 
operating, maintaining and marketing the 
system - for in further contrast to GPS and 
GLONASS, Galileo will inter alia provide 
services against fees. 
Whilst the question "Quo vadis, Galileo?' 
has thus by and large been answered, the 
question to be dealt with by this paper by 
contrast remains: 'Quis vadit cum vobis, 
Galileo?' - 'Who goes (there) with you?' 
2. The Galileo core services 
Before going into further detail regarding 
this essentially institutional question, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of what 
the system will actually do, and why it was 
decided to develop it in the first place, in a 
little more detail. 
Galileo will provide a number of signals, 
which through various combinations and 
the addition of data or other features will 
amount to five core types of services, 
considered as Galileo-only services: 
• the Open Service (OS); 
• the Commercial Services (CS); 
• the Safety-Of-Life Services (SOL); 
• the Public Regulated Services 
(PRS); and 
• a contribution to existing Search-
And-Rescue Services (SAR). 
OS and CS might be classified as 'private 
services', in the sense that there are no 
direct public concerns - as opposed to 
general interests in economic and social 
benefits - calling for such services to be 
provided. 
The Open Service essentially equates with 
the signals known as GPS SPS and 
GLONASS SPS (though it may offer 
somewhat enhanced accuracy and 
continuity), and will be provided without 
any integrity monitoring. As an open 
access signal it is available to anyone with 
the right receiver, without any user fee. 
Thus, there is no contract or quasi-
contract involved. Such usage will as a 
consequence be individualised, and will 
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focus on a number of personalised mass-
market applications. 
The Commercial Services by contrast will 
be provided against a fee, and hence be 
covered by a contract, to any value-added 
service provider or end-user willing to 
pay the price for the data added onto the 
signal proper, as well as for a service 
guarantee to be provided and other 
benefits (such as relating to liability). The 
positioning/navigation services provided 
as Commercial Services will likely be 
incorporated by value-added service 
providers in such areas as banking 
services, various telecommunications 
applications and Location-Based Services 
(LBS) services with· a certain 
commercial value, but not safety-sensitive 
and hence not specifically requiring high 
levels of continuity and integrity. 
SOL, PRS and the contribution to SAR 
might in contrast with OS and CS be 
classified as 'public services', since their 
raison d'etre is a public need for safety-
and/or security-enhancing services. 
The Public Regulated Services in a sense 
also provide a second manifestation of a 
contractual Galileo service. Since their 
usage is envisaged in certain security-
related and (other) governmental areas 
(police and emergency services, possibly 
also military usage), the signals will be 
encrypted and secured against 
unauthorised usage. Access to these 
services is principally available only to a 
closed user group of governmental (or 
closely government-aligned) entities, 
which will have to conclude a contract in 
some fonn to avail themselves of the 
necessary decryption keys required for 
access. 
The Safety-Of-Life Services would then 
form the third manifestation of contractual 
core services to be provided by Galileo. 
They will also somehow -likely indirectly 
- be provided against fees, and will be 
fully augmented (including the level of 
integrity monitoring required by the 
aviation sector). Thus, somehow 
contractual arrangements will underpin 
this service provision, though as of yet it is 
not certain how this would be structured, 
as a consequence of the current structure 
of navigation service provision in the 
aviation sector. 
Additionally, Galileo will contribute to the 
existing global system of satellite-based 
Search-and-Rescue (SAR) services, 
notably as a European segment of the 
COSP AS-SARSAT system. In view of its 
special contributory character, however, 
this Galileo service will not further be 
taken into consideration here. 
In addition to these five Galileo-only 
services as dealt with, from a broader 
perspective also Galileo local services are 
to be provided by Local Elements plus 
(optionally) Regional Elements; and 
Galileo combined services are to be 
provided by other systems together with 
any combination of Galileo, Regional 
Elements and various types of Local 
Elements. 
The option of co-operating with Regional 
Elements is considered in order to allow 
those non-European regions interested in 
providing their own integrity monitoring 
to link up with Galileo. Local Elements 
are envisaged to be established wherever 
there would be a local need for even more 
enhanced accuracy and availability than 
the Galileo services themselves can offer. 
3. Galileo: Towards a PPP 
Galileo is a project initiated by the 
European Commission on behalf of the 
European Union and its member states and 
the European Space Agency and its 
member states. 5 The overarching political, 
economic and social mISSIOn of 
establishing Galileo has been summarised 
as "to develop and implement a 
competitive, leading edge Global 
Navigation Satellite system, which 
provides the best in choice and quality to 
the end user, attracting business 
investment and supporting ongoing social 
and economic growth in Europe".6 In other 
words: Galileo is supposed to bring social, 
economic, safety- and security-related as 
well as political and strategic benefits 
especially to the European states and 
peoples involved, but in a wider sense to 
all states interested in such benefits. 
It may be interesting to note in this respect 
that the People's Republic of China has 
declared its Willingness early in 2003 to 
discuss a contribution in the range of 200 
M€ to the development and deployment 
phase of Galileo in return for substantial 
and structural involvement in the system 
operations at the highest level - i.e. 
presumably either as member state of a 
relevant public supervisory body, or as 
partner thereof at a level of principled 
equality. 
One key element of the Galileo project 
from the outset was the aim to include 
private participation, comprising from this 
perspective essentially both private 
investment and private operational and 
decisional involvement, in a fundamental 
and substantive fashion through some 
form of PPP. This aim is already reflected 
at the highest level in the choice to include 
both a public supervisor, taking care of the 
various public interests and concerns in 
Galileo, and a private operator reflecting 
the PPP at the core of the institutional 
structure. 
The main reasons for involving a private 
operator as a key entity in the 
organisational structure for a system with 
obvious fundamental public aspects were 
the following: 
• for flexible, non-bureaucratic and 
commercial modes of operation; 
• for marketing purposes; 
• for obtaining finances and 
investments from the capital markets in 
normal commercial modes; 
• for dealing with IPR issues in a 
proper and more commercially-oriented 
fashion; 
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• for obtaining msurance against 
limited liability; and 
• for making a sensible business 
partner. 
A further envisaged beneficial aspect of a 
private operator is generally conceived to 
consist of the far better capabilities of, and 
opportunities available to, a private entity 
to develop new services and markets in a 
commercially assertive manner. 
Vice versa, the reasons for involving a 
public oversight body as a key entity in the 
organisational structure for a system where 
private and commercial modes of 
operation have been deemed to be most 
beneficial were the following: 
• for negotiating and concluding 
agreements with states 'external' to 
Galileo yet hosting Galileo-related 
assets/service providers; 
• for licensing non-European 
augmentation and integrity providers (or 
negotiating and concluding agreements on 
such operations by the private operator); 
• for serving the general public 
interests e.g. in regard of safety, security 
and search-and-rescue issues; and 
• for (possibly) offering unlimited 
liability in the last resort to value-added 
service providers and end-users. 
Further envisaged beneficial aspects of a 
public supervisor would generally be seen 
to consist of enhanced trust by the public 
at large in the system (with respect to such 
issues as certification and safety licenses), 
as well as by negotiating where necessary 
access for the private operator to the 
markets of states not belonging to the 
Galileo core group of states. Finally, also 
liaising with other relevant organisations 
(such as ICAO and IMO) would best be 
undertaken by such a public supervisor. 
4. Galileo: the current status 
Until recently, the task of preparing the 
ground for Galileo fell on the Galileo 
Interim Support Structure (GISS), 
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essentially embodying the assignment of a 
number of expert ESA staff members to 
work under guidance from the European 
Commission. The GISS, established 
December 2001, inter alia took over 
supervision of the study projects going on 
in the EU framework, as well as setting 
the scene for a more permanent and 
institutionalised entity once the political 
hurdles at the highest level would have 
been overcome. 
Once this was achieved, the overarching 
aim of combining the efforts, expertise 
and input of both the public and the 
private sector in Europe resulted in the 
final establishment of the Galileo Joint 
Undertaking (GJU) this summer 
following the relevant EU Council 
Resolution of May 2002.7 Currently the 
GJU represents only the two key public 
partners in Galileo, the European Union 
through the Commission and the 
European Space Agency, whereas at a 
later stage it is envisaged that private 
partners would also participate (including 
through investments) in the GJU. 
Legally speaking, the GJU is a unique 
animal: whilst it would, at least for the 
first period of its existence, essentially be 
the vehicle for co-operation of two 
intergovernmental organisations, the EU 
and ESA, it does not constitute an 
intergovernmental entity itself. To start 
with, it was not established by means of 
an international treaty, but through an EU 
Council Regulation. Furthermore, 
international legal personality was 
expressly excluded at various points in the 
texts. Whilst not a private entity properly 
speaking either, for the purposes of 
European law - or for that matter of the 
national laws of the state where the GJU 
is established, i.e. Belgium - it would 
nevertheless be subjected to the same 
regimes as private entities. 
The present role of the GJU essentially 
consists of preparing the ground in 
general terms for the deployment and 
operational phases of the Galileo system, 
and more specifically of selecting the 
private consortium which would come to 
play the central role in the institutional 
structure as the private operator by that 
time. Though nothing specific has been 
decided or even indicated yet with respect 
to such a scenario, it may tentatively be 
assumed that the GJU (especially after the 
private operator has been chosen) will 
also prepare the ground for the public 
supervisor, or possibly evolve itself into 
taking such a role. 
This last option would likely require the 
absence of private participation in the 
GJU other than in an advisory or 
contributory capacity, since the public 
supervisory character would fit ill with a 
(co-)decision-making role of private 
entities. It may be noted here that the GJU 
as such is established for an interim 
period, which indeed so far leaves all 
options open. 
5. The public supervisor 
So, on the one hand it has been decided to 
establish a public entity of the 
international variant - currently going by 
the name of Galileo Supervisory Authority 
(GSA)8 - as a core element of the 
organisational structure for Galileo. This 
entity should at least take care of the 
evident public interests in Europe in 
building and maintaining the Galileo 
system in the first place (e.g. security, 
safety and general economic progress), as 
well as relevant international aspects 
(negotiations with third states), generally 
speaking by exercising some sort of 
control over the private operator. 
In addition, the GSA may become the 
owner of the system as a preferred option; 
it should at a minimum be involved in 
maintenance, replenishment and further 
development thereof. However, this will 
be a matter yet to be determined by policy 
choices and concession negotiations. 
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More in detail the role of the GSA as 
public supervisor would have to focus on: 
• providing the political credibility at 
the international level necessary to 
enhance, wherever necessary through 
international legal agreements, the 
business opportunities for the private 
operator, especially with regard to OS and 
CS; 
• ensuring that the general public as 
well as specific European interests in 
Galileo are duly respected by the private 
operator's operations and activities, 
especially when it comes to SOL, PRS and 
the contribution to SAR; 
• ensuring a proper and fair liability 
regime, possibly including a 
Compensation Fund, for relevant types of 
damage occurring in the course of Galileo 
activities and operations; 
• ensuring a proper certification 
scheme as a specific means to enhance the 
overall trust of value-added servIce 
providers, end-users, consumers and the 
public at large in Galileo; and 
• ensuring that any bankruptcy or 
other market failure of the private operator 
would not unduly prejudice the overall 
interests of the Galileo core states in 
Galileo, preferably through ownership of 
the system. 
6. The private operator 
On the other hand, the institutional 
structure shall at its core include a private 
company - currently named Galileo 
Operating Company (GOC)9:it should at 
least operate the system and market the 
services, as well as develop new markets, 
and in addition could possibly own the 
system or at least be closely involved in 
maintenance, replenishment and further 
development thereof. This, however, as 
indicated is in the last resort firstly a 
policy or political rather than a legal 
decision, and secondly, likely to be the 
subject of further negotiations as part of 
the bidding process for the Galileo 
concession. 
The role of the GOC as private operator 
would consequently focus on: 
• using its market know-how and 
other advantages of private modes of 
operation for turning the provision of 
Galileo services into a profitable business, 
in particular with respect to OS and CS; 
• ensuring that the obligations 
imposed upon it by or through the GSA 
will be properly balanced with guaranteed 
long-term revenues, such as by availability 
payments or shadow tolls, and other 
relevant assurances with respect to SOL, 
PRS, and the contribution to SAR; and 
• ensuring generally that the risks 
imposed on it through the PPP would be 
those it is capable of handling best, and 
this moreover in return for the proper 
incentives. 
It would be the GOC's business for 
example to conclude contracts with value-
added service providers interested in 
integrating CS into broader services to be 
offered to the latter's customers; e.g. by 
adding databases and communications 
facilities offering taxi companies a 
detailed and continuously updated traffic 
information system. 
Under circumstances, the GOC might also 
come to act itself as value-added service 
provider; especially for the purpose of 
developing new markets by way of pilot 
projects this is an approach currently being 
contemplated. Also, whilst as such the 
concepts of Regional Elements and Local 
Elements have been developed envisaging 
those to be entities outside the Galileo 
institutional framework proper, nothing in 
principle would prevent the GOC from 
taking up such a role. At the same time, 
both possible extensions of the GOC's role 
would lead to considerable complications 
as a consequence of additional legal 
regimes and issues being involved. 
By contrast to the above therefore, another 
option open to the future GOC would be to 
actually establish a daughter company for 
each of the Galileo core services which are 
to be delivered, in view of the fundamental 
differences between OS, CS, PRS and 
SOL (not to mention the contribution to 
SAR) also in terms of markets. 
If commercially feasible, the private 
operator could also contract directly with 
individual users who are interested in 
Galileo timing or positioning information 
of a higher quality than the OS, and are 
willing to pay for it. 
Finally, the GOC will serve the general 
public as well as the aim of opening up 
and developing new markets by the 
establishment of Service Centres of some 
kind, providing inter alia necessary 
information on standardisation and 
certification issues, liability arrangements 
and general opportunities for contracting 
with the GOC to obtain its services. 
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Again, as there are a number of serious 
alternative options available, in the end 
much will depend upon the bidding and 
negotiating process as well as upon who 
will finally win the concession. 
7. The Galileo LegallFunctional Model 
The above general analysis leads to a 
rather complex construction in terms of 
Galileo services and entities, which is best 
illustrated by the Galileo Legal/Functional 
Model developed in the context of various 
Galileo-related studies; a generic summary 
version of which, not including for 
example the special case of Galileo' s 
contribution to SAR activities, IS 
reproduced below as Table 1. 
Table 1. The Galileo Legal/Functional Model (simplified generic version). 
Regional 
Elements 
Local 
Elements 
services 
Va/ue-
added 
services 
8. The Concession Agreement 
The most important issue, in legal terms, 
of the PPP and the relationship between 
GSA and GCO at the heart of Galileo' s 
envisaged institutional structure, is 
provided by a Concession Agreement, 
serving as an umbilical cord between the 
two entities. 
From this perspective, such a Concession 
Agreement, including wherever relevant 
flanking arrangements, should first of all 
establish clarity on key issues such as the 
financing aspects which are at the heart of 
any PPP - read the respective shares and 
modes of financial contribution from 
public and private sectors. This, in close 
co-operation and consultation with the 
private sector which has to bid for the 
concession. 
Such financing arrangements to be 
proposed should closely mirror the 
respective risks taken by public and 
private sectors under the concession PPP. 
Generally speaking risks are to be borne 
by the respective PPP partner best 
equipped to handle them, and should thus 
distinguish between public and private 
risks. Public risks in this regard refer to 
such risks as policy, legal, regulatory and 
licensing risks, in particular as relevant 
for SOL, PRS and the contribution to 
SAR in view of the public characteristics 
of those services. Private risks would 
refer in particular to financing and 
commercial risks, such as revenue risks 
(especially for CS) and intellectual 
property rights-related risks (especially 
for OS). Finally, some hybrid risks should 
be dealt with jointly, such as most 
importantly liability risks. 
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The Concession Agreement either itself or 
through flanking arrangements should 
furthermore deal with the following 
important issues: 
• the distribution of (contractual) 
liability; 
• the possible need for denial of 
Galileo services in security-sensitive 
situations; 
• potential bankruptcy or other 
fundamental failure of the GOC; 
• how IPR should be distributed and 
dealt with; 
• to what extent service guarantees 
would be imposed (in particular for SOL 
and PRS, whereas with respect to CS it 
should be left largely to the commercial 
freedom of decision-making of the GOC); 
• certification; 
• long-term planning issues, 
including re-competition issues and 
availability payments or other public 
sector contributions; and 
• the applicable commercial law for 
any business disputes. 
9. The Example of Inmarsat 
For the future drafting of a Concession 
Agreement and any flanking 
arrangements, the case of INMARSA T-
after-privatisation would serve as an 
interesting example. The residual 
intergovernmental organisation IMSO 
maintains, through a binding Public 
Service Agreement which can not be 
unilaterally altered or cancelled, control 
over the private operator Inmarsat with 
respect to those public services which the 
latter is obliged to continue to provide. 1o 
For Inmarsat, this mainly referred to the 
Global Maritime Distress and Safety 
System (GMDSS); in the case of Galileo, 
this should refer especially to the 
obligatory aspects of SOL, PRS and the 
contribution to SAR, as well as the more 
general obligations regarding security 
issues in particular. 
The PSA is further 'flanked' by a set of 
arrangements, called Restructuring 
Arrangements, dealing with other specific 
aspects of the relationship IMSO-Inmarsat 
and the transitional period. These 
concerned: 
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• The Master Transition Agreement, the 
principal agreement between the old 
INMARSAT, the new Inmarsat 
companies established under the UK 
Companies Act of 1985, and the 
Signatories. The other agreements, 
with the exception of the LESO 
Agreements, were attached as 
schedules to the Master Transition 
Agreement. 
• The Master Novation Agreements 
between the old INMARSAT, the 
Company and each Signatory relating 
to the novation of Signatory contracts. 
Under the Novation Agreements, 
INMARSAT ceased to be a party to 
any contract and was replaced by the 
Company. 
• The Business Transfer Agreement 
between INMARSA T and Inmarsat 
Ltd. relating to the transfer of the 
business from INMARSA T to the 
Company. 
• The Licence Agreement between 
INMARSAT and the Company 
relating to the use of the INMARSAT 
name and logo. 
• The Shareholders Agreement between 
Holdings and the shareholders, by 
means of which the shareholders 
agreed to support the company to 
carry out an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO). 
• The Land Earth Station Operators 
(LESO) Agreements between Inmarsat 
Ltd. and each of the LES operators. 
The LESO Agreement authorises the 
LES operators to provide services via 
Inmarsat. 
Thus, a whole set of well-elaborated 
arrangements was necessary to ensure a 
proper transition from the old to the new 
situation, as well as a proper relationship 
between the new public and private 
partners. 
10. Towards a Galileo Convention? 
For a number of reasons, it might be 
desirable moreover to establish a dedicated 
Galileo Convention, i.e. an international 
treaty between the Galileo core group of 
states acting as an umbrella over the 
Concession Agreement. This Convention 
should inter alia provide for the proper 
establishment of the GSA including some 
measure of international legal personality 
and functional immunities; as well as deal 
with the residual responsibilities of the 
states behind it, security- and safety-
interfaces with other relevant 
organisations and authorities, liability 
solutions in terms of a Compensation 
Fund, Galileo international relations, 
certification schemes and the role and 
competencies of any Galileo-dedicated 
regulatory body if such a body were to be 
established. 
It should be noted here from an 
institutional perspective, that such 
concepts as 'GSA' and 'Galileo-dedicated 
regulatory body' in first instance would be 
referring to abstract roles, without 
prejudice as to which entity, new or 
existing, would eventually be entrusted 
with the relevant tasks, status and role. 
Any Galileo-dedicated regulatory body 
however would for reasons of 
transparency and fairness obviously need 
to be clearly separate from a GSA, even as 
the latter will have some important public 
and semi-regulatory competencies as well. 
This means that if, for example, the 
European Union as represented by the 
European Commission would come to take 
up the role of regulatory body - which it 
seems excellently placed to do, in view of 
the extended regulatory machinery which 
the Commission can avail itself of - the 
role of GSA by contrast should not be 
played by any entity too closely aligned to, 
or even part of, the EU institutional 
machinery. 
Whereas in the long run a Convention 
would provide the optimum solution, it is 
clear it might take a long time to become 
realised, and might even turn out not to be 
politically feasible. For both reasons, 
certainly in the short run EC law 
harmonisation measures, taking advantage 
of the well-weathered legislative 
machinery existing within the European 
Union, should in particular complement 
existing law and regulation not to be 
changed easily - in other words: in 
particular in those areas not yet 
structurally covered by legal regimes 
(mostly focusing on the multi-modal 
aspects of Galileo therefore, exceptions 
mainly arising in such areas as rail and 
road transport) and dedicated to the novel, 
overarching and comprehensive features 
of Galileo. 
11. A special issue: liability and Galileo 
Liability, as the most down-to-earth and 
financially quantifiable issue in GNSS, 
also presents a special issue from the 
institutional perspective. In principle, a 
number of existing relevant regimes would 
remain applicable also to cases of damage 
involving Galileo even if none of them are 
to any appreciable extent focused on 
GNSS or navigation-related issues. They 
would moreover, to the extent agreed upon 
at the international level, or conversely to 
the extent constituting a matter for 
national law of non-Galileo core states 
relevant as potential Galileo markets, not 
be easily changed by any regulatory effort 
within those core states andlor the 
European Union. This concerns in 
particular non-contractual (third party/tort) 
and product liability. Any Galileo-
dedicated liability regime should therefore 
be essentially built 'on top of such 
existing liability regimes, e.g. by efforts to 
harmonise relevant third party liability for 
Galileo-related cases at an EU level - as it 
368 
was achieved to some extent in the area of 
product liability. 
As to contractual liability, it would of 
course operate in first instance as between 
GOC and contracted service providers 
(and possibly end-users). The relevant 
contracts at the same time should deal 
most prominently with derogation of non-
contractual liability claims addressed to 
the latter, to the extent erroneous or absent 
Galileo signals/services would be found to 
constitute the (ultimate) cause of the 
damage. This in turn requires the 
incorporation of monitoring equipment in 
the system, in order to distinguish such 
cases from those where other causes 
would be responsible for the damage, as 
well as a coherent certification system 
providing the GOC with a possible 
defence against undue claims. 
Furthermore, in view of the Galileo 
business case, it would be desirable to 
establish a two-tier liability system in 
dealing both with direct non-contractual 
liability claims against the GOC, and with 
the contractual derogation of non-
contractual liability claims against its 
contracted customers. The first tier would 
call for liability of the GOC up to a certain 
limit, for which the GOC would obtain 
obligatory insurance at reasonable cost. 
The second tier should be somehow taken 
care of by the GSA and/or the member 
states behind it, with the option of a 
Compensation Fund (similar to the cases 
of oil pollutionll and the nuclear power 
industry 12) presenting the preferable 
instrument. 
Whilst these scenarios would obviously 
have to be integrated into the Concession 
Agreement or a flanking arrangement, 
preferably they would also be covered by 
the proposed Galileo Convention. In view 
of the distinct possibilities for such a 
Convention to be realised only at a later 
stage, or even not at all, it would be 
advisable in the meantime to use the 
contractual chain-concept developed for 
aviation-related liability in the context of 
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Eurocontrol and to be embodied in the 
relevant Framework Agreement as much 
as feasible also in the wider context of 
Galileo, to ensure that a reasonably proper 
and coherent liability regime would be in 
place from the start. 
Such liability 'guarantees' finally should 
be incorporated as a core element into the 
broader concept of service guarantees, as 
these would be foreseen for (in particular) 
CS (similar guarantees could also be 
envisaged vis-ii-vis SOL and PRS, but 
would take on a different character for a 
number of reasons; in the first case it 
might be better to refer to 'integrity 
guarantees' , in the second case to 'security 
guarantees') - but obviously subject to the 
commercial feasibility as perceived by the 
GOC-to-be. Such service guarantees 
would, beside guaranteeing a certain 
service level, also guarantee the 
continuous availability of that service level 
- in other words, effectively integrity. 
12. Concluding remarks 
It is clear that a highly complex, and in 
some respects quite revolutionary system 
such as Galileo is going to be, inter alia 
requires a sound institutional and legal 
framework within which to operate. 
Whilst the main contours of such a 
framework have by now gradually become 
clear, such as the PPP-structure 
encompassing a public supervisor and a 
private operator at the heart of the system 
and the need for a comprehensive 
Concession Agreement-structure 
preferably backed up with a proper Galileo 
Convention, these contours only raise 
further and more detailed legal and 
institutional issues. Some of them, e.g. 
how risks have to be allocated, how 
liability will have to be dealt with, and 
how to balance the respective 
competencies of the two entities thus 
involved, have briefly been touched upon 
in this paper. Some others, such as how to 
deal with IPR, standardisation and 
certification issue, still remain to be 
analysed in greater depth. 
Yet, generally speaking, analysis would 
have to occur along the same lines; and the 
Galileo LegallFunctional Model also here 
may serve as an indicator as to how to 
proceed. In any event, there is still a lot of 
legal analysis and work to do, before 
Galileo will become operational in 2008. 
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